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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S ACTION PLAN TO
MODERNIZE EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: HOW FAR
SHOULD THE SEC GO IN EXEMPTING EUROPEAN ISSUERS
FROM COMPLYING WITH THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT?
Kristina A. Sadlak*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 2002, in response to a series of corporate and
accounting scandals,1 Congress passed the most comprehensive
securities legislation since the 1930s,2 commonly known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act).3 President George W. Bush referred to the
Act as the “most far-reaching overhaul of the nation’s business
practices since the Great Depression.”4 The Act affects virtually every

* J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law (2006); M.Sc. London School of
Economics (2003); B.A. New York University (2002). Miss Sadlak is an associate at
Wiggin and Dana, LLP in New Haven, CT, and is an Adjunct Professor of Economics
at Manchester Community College, also in Connecticut. She would like to thank Dean
Emeritus Phillip Blumberg and Professor Patricia McCoy at the University of
Connecticut School of Law for their assistance with this article.
1
Most notably the 2002 Enron and WorldCom collapses. See Matthew M.
Benov, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating Foreign Private
Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW 439, 440.
“The collapse of WorldCom illustrated that Enron was not simply an anomaly and that
America needed corporate reform. The sudden and immediate collapse of two
corporate giants forced the U.S. Congress and the President to respond,” id. at 441.
2
See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning
Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Before the Senate Committee on
Banking,
Housing
and
Urban
Affairs,
§
II
(Sept.
9,
2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter Testimony
Concerning Implementation]. The Act was passed “[t]o address the widespread
collapse of investor confidence and the recognition that something had gone seriously
awry in segments of corporate America,” id. at § II. See also George W. Bush,
Statement by the President of the United States upon Signing H.R. 3763 (Jul. 30,
2002), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 543.
3
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SarbanesOxley Act].
4
See Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms Into Law; President Says Era
of “False Profits” is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4.
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facet of the United States’ capital markets.5 Enacted for the express
purpose of protecting investors by “improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities
laws,”6 the Act’s principle objectives are to restore investor confidence
and to assure the integrity of U.S. markets.7 By passing the Act,
Congress intended to address the systematic and structural weaknesses
recently plaguing capital markets, which weaknesses are due mostly to
ineffective audits and the lack of corporate responsibility.8
The Act’s provisions require the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Agency) to promulgate rules implementing the
legislation.9 To date, the SEC has made substantial progress toward
this end.10 The Act’s extensive rules and accompanying regulations
apply to both domestic and foreign securities issuers that list in the
United States or file reports with the SEC.11 As a result, the rules
promulgated by the SEC in accordance with the Act initially subjected
about 1300 foreign companies to the Act’s new requirements.12 For
example, the New York Stock Exchange lists 460 non-U.S. companies
with a global market value of roughly $7.1 trillion.13

5

See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3; Bush, supra note 2, at 543.
7
See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III. The major
objectives of the Act “can be grouped into the following themes: to strengthen and
restore confidence in the accounting profession; to strengthen enforcement of the
federal securities laws; to improve the ‘tone at the top’ and executive responsibility; to
improve disclosure and financial reporting; and to improve the performance of
‘gatekeepers.’” Id.
8
JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW
AND EXPLANATION 13 (2002).
9
See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § I. See generally
Emily Williams, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Is the Investing Public Really Better Off?,
33 N.M.L. REV. 481 (2003).
10
See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § I (stating “we
have met all of the mandates and challenges set out by the Act, and in record time”).
11
See id. at § III(F)(1).
12
See Corinne A. Falencki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1211 (2004). See also Paula L.
Green, Overseas Companies to SEC: Don’t Tie Us Down With New Governance
Rules, GLOBAL FIN., Nov. 2002, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3715/
is_200211/ai_n9126258 (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
13
New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/
about/listed/listed.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (stating the New York Stock
Exchange is currently home to roughly 2800 companies with a global market value of
about $21 trillion).
6
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However, the SEC must face the reality that the development of
multinational corporations,14 changing technology, and the removal of
capital controls worldwide have brought about a truly global securities
market that may require some exemptions for foreign issuers.15
At the outset, the SEC did not provide any exemptions for foreign
issuers.16 Not surprisingly, the Agency received countless objections
and complaints from foreign securities issuers regarding the
application of its rules.17 European companies chiefly complain that
many of the Act’s provisions infringe upon other nations’ sovereignty,
and as a result, the United States is acting “as a global corporate
regulator.”18 Foreign issuers also claim that the Act’s stringent
requirements fail to respect corporate structure norms in their home
states.19 Strict compliance with the Act will cause European issuers to
incur significant costs and time commitments. For example, European
issuers must conform their financial statements to the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), reorganize their Board of
Directors and audit committees, and comply with potentially
conflicting corporate governance requirements. In response to
mounting criticism from European issuers and governments, the SEC
has finally started to address foreign issuers’ concerns by granting

14
Multinational corporations play a key role in both the U.S. and in the world
economy. Such corporations operate throughout the world, entities incorporate under
the laws of the countries in which they operate and have multi-tiered structures with a
plethora of subsidiaries, and are incorporated under the laws of the countries in which
they operate. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., 5 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 1.01
(2005).
15
See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, The Internationalization of Capital, in
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 36 (Herbert Kitschelt et al.
eds., 1999) (noting that “the internationalization and integration of capital markets has
been the most significant change in the political economy of the industrialized
countries over the past three decades”). See also Ethiopis Tafara, Director Office of
International Affairs, SEC, Testimony Concerning Global Markets, National
Regulation, and Cooperation Before the House Financial Services Committee (May
13, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051304et.htm.
16
See discussion, infra Part I (discussing the President and the SEC’s intent to
apply the Act in the same manner to domestic and foreign issuers).
17
See discussion, infra Part I.
18
See Falencki, supra note 12, at 1218.
19
See discussion, infra Part I. See generally Jonathan Shirley, International Law
and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 501, 525 (2004) (arguing that the Act offends traditional notions of comity).
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them exemptions to several of the Act’s provisions, which this paper
discusses in later sections.20
Just nine months after Congress’ enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, on May 21, 2003, the European Commission of the European
Union (EC) presented a plan entitled “Modernizing Company Law and
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to
Move Forward” (Plan).21 The Plan seeks to enhance investor
confidence “in the wake of recent corporate governance scandals”22
and to foster the worldwide efficiency and competitiveness of
businesses in the E.U.23 The Plan affects all E.U.-member countries
and contains a set of legislative24 proposals and recommendations to
be enacted over three phases through the year 2009.25 The Plan
addresses many of the same reforms as the Act, but leaves significant
room for flexibility in order to respect the differences in corporate
norms and the diverging practices of E.U. Member States.26
This paper proposes that the SEC should take further steps to
exempt European issuers from certain of the Act’s provisions because
they fail to consider the different E.U. corporate practice norms and
because they infringe on the sovereignty of other nations.
Additionally, European issuers should be exempt because the EC Plan

20

See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(F)(I).
Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union—A Plan to Move Forward, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 284 final) 3
(2003) [hereinafter Modernizing Company Law].
22
Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21. The Parmalat scandal is the latest
in a series of corporate scandals, in which, despite annual losses of 350 to 450 million
euros from the 1990s through 2001, the company accountings showed positive
earnings for the years in question. Id. Billions of euro-bonds were issued, despite the
group’s weak real financial situation of the group. It is speculated that the scandal
resulted from improperly functioning internal controls within Parmalat’s extensive
subsidiaries web of subsidiaries, a lack of corporate leadership and governance, and
audit failures. See Communication From the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on Preventing and Combating Corporate and Financial
Malpractice, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 611 final) 3 (2004).
23
See id.
24
Legislative instruments are defined as requiring “either the adoption of a new
legislative proposal or the modification of one or several existing legislative
instruments.” See Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at n5.
25
Press Release, Latham & Watkins LLP, The European Commission Publishes
its Action Plan on Modernizing European Company Law & Enhancing Corporate
Governance in Response to Enron, Ahold, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Oct. 24, 2003.
26
See generally Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21.
21
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will likely accomplish the desired goals of the Act. The SEC could
create additional limited exemptions without compromising the
purposes of the Act—to restore investor confidence in the markets and
to assure the integrity of the U.S. market. These exemptions include:
1) permitting European issuers to file financial statements with the
SEC using only International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 2)
exempting European issuers from audit committee independence
requirements when the issuer’s home country independence standards
are the same as the SEC’s, 3) exempting European issuers from CEO
and CFO certification requirements when the issuer’s home country or
the EC imposes collective liability on board members, and 4)
exempting European issuers from Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) registration and inspection if the
EC’s Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and
Committee on Auditing oversight capabilities parallel those of the
PCAOB.
In Part I, this paper will briefly discuss the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
initial impact on foreign issuers. Part II introduces the EC’s Plan,
contrasting it with the Act. Part III analyzes the provisions of the Act
and the accompanying SEC rules affecting European companies,
contrasting them with equivalent provisions of the EC’s Plan. Part III
also examines measures that the SEC has already taken to exempt
European issuers from compliance with the Act, including a discussion
of what further steps could be taken. Part IV summarizes the proposed
exemptions.
II. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
The Act’s provisions are far-reaching, making no explicit
distinction between domestic and foreign issuers. The provisions and
accompanying rules apply to any issuer who registers securities on an
American exchange and, more broadly, to any issuer who is required
to file reports with the SEC.27 Many provisions, such as the executiveofficer-certification requirement, also apply to specific foreign
corporations not issuing securities on a U.S. exchange. Today, the
SEC requires foreign issuers with assets greater than $10 million, more
than 300 U.S. shareholders, and more than 500 total worldwide

27

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 3, at § 2.
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shareholders to register and file reports with the SEC.28 Previously, the
SEC exempted companies falling within this category from certain
registration requirements, provided they submit reports containing
information that the issuer’s home country required to be made
public.29
Apparently, the SEC intends to apply all provisions of the Act to
foreign issuers registering in the United States and filing reports with
the SEC.30 Yet, the Agency has also stated that it is “prepared to
consider how [it] can fulfill the mandate of the Act through . . .
rulemaking and interpretive authority in ways that accommodate the

28

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g); Commission Notice: List of Foreign
Issuers Which Have Submitted Information Under the Exemption Relating to Certain
Foreign Securities, Release No. 34-39681 (Feb. 19, 1998). See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, 5 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 211 (2000). See generally
Stahr & Palenberg, supra note 23.
29
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12g3-2(b) provides an exemption from
registration under Section 12(g) with respect to a foreign private issuer that submits to
the Commission, on a current basis, the material required by the Rule. The
informational requirements are designed to give investors access to certain
information so they have the opportunity to inform themselves about the issuer. The
Rule requires the issuer to provide the Commission with information that it has: 1)
made or is required to make public pursuant to the law of the country of its domicile or
the country in which it is incorporated or organized; 2) filed or is required to file with
a stock exchange on which its securities are traded and that was made public by such
exchange; and/or, 3) distributed or is required to distribute to its securities holders.
Commission Notice: List of Foreign Issuers Which Have Submitted Information
Under the Exemption Relating to Certain Foreign Securities, Securities Act Release
No. 34-39681 (Feb. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-39681.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2006). In December 2005, the SEC announced that it will propose
new reporting requirements, for example, that a foreign issuer may end its reporting
requirements if ten percent or less of total shares are held by U.S. investors. Andrew
Parker, SEC Reform to Ease U.S. Reporting Obligations, FT.COM, Dec. 4, 2005; Press
Release, SEC Votes to Propose Rules on Tender Offers, Foreign Issuer,
Deregistration; See also Votes to Adopt Filing Acceleration Changes (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-176.htm.
30
See Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, A Single Capital Market in Europe: Challenges
for Global Companies, Remarks at the Conference of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants
of
England
and
Wales
(Oct.
10,
2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 589.htm. See also William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, Testimony Concerning the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Apr. 21,
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042105whd.htm (noting that “the Act
affects every reporting company, both domestic and foreign, as well as their officers
and directors and other key participants in our capital markets”).
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home country requirements and regulatory approaches of the home
jurisdiction of our foreign registrants and potential registrants.”31
The Act not only imposes significant costs on foreign issuers, but
many of its provisions conflict with European norms relating to the
structure and practices of corporations as discussed in Part III(C)(1)
and (D)(1). At the outset, numerous European issuers, interest groups,
and governments widely opposed the Act.32 For example, the Union of
Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE) voiced
concern over the application of the Act to European issuers.33
Specifically, UNICE complained that because European issuers
already face tough audit standards, the extra burdens imposed by the
Act are unnecessary.34. UNICE also complained that although
European countries and businesses support standardized corporate
governance standards, these standards are nevertheless a product of the
legal and economic cultures prevailing in each country.35
Likewise, European issuers object to the Act because compliance
with the Act’s provisions imposes burdensome costs. In some
instances requires issuers to comply with conflicting regulations.36
German entities decried the incompatibility of the Act’s corporate
governance provisions with German corporate governance laws.37 The
European Commission’s Director General, Alexander Schaub, even
requested that the SEC exempt all E.U. companies and auditors from
the Act’s corporate governance reform provisions.38

31

Id.
See A.M. Best Company, Inc., Sarbanes-Oxley Adds Uncertainty to European
View of U.S. Markets, BESTWIRE, Mar. 10, 2003 (stating “there’s a concern in the
European Union about a lack of deference to the European regulatory environment”
and “the idea that the U.S. approach to corporate governance and financial reporting is
too rigid and complex is fairly common in Europe”).
33
See Maria Camilla Cardilli, LLM Perspectives: Regulation Without Borders:
The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 785,
791 (2004).
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id. at 791-92.
37
Green, supra note 12.
38
Letter from Alexander Schaub, Director General of the European
Commission, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Feb. 18, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/ proposed/s70203/aschaub1.htm. Alexander Schaub stated in
full:
We request full recognition of equivalence of EU corporate
governance system …. The SEC should be aware that EU
32
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Prior to the Act, the SEC respected the different laws under which
foreign issuers were incorporated. Consequently, the SEC did not
require that foreign issuers in the U.S. capital markets comply with
provisions relating to registration and disclosure.39 Instead, the SEC
allowed foreign companies to prepare their financial statements
according to U.S. GAAP, or some other adequate alternative
accounting standard.40 As with the Act, companies preparing financial
statements according to standards other than U.S. GAAP were
required to include a reconciliation of material variations between the
two standards.41 Before the Act, however, the SEC only required a
signature on behalf of the company. Now, the Act requires a specific
corporate officer to verify such reconciliations.42 Furthermore, prior to
the Act, the SEC did not subject foreign issuers to requirements
regarding internal control procedures. 43 It noted that doing so “may be
inconsistent with the laws or practices of the foreign private issuers’
home jurisdiction and stock exchange requirements.”44

companies and auditors are already subject to longstanding, welldeveloped member state corporate governance requirements. These
are tailored to their specific legal environments and are in their
different ways as effective and efficient at providing investor
protection as U.S. rules. Additional requirements of the SarbanesOxley Act applied to EU companies and auditors would place on
them an unnecessary additional layer of requirements—taken from
a completely different (U.S.) corporate governance environment.
We fail to see why EU companies and auditors should be
overburdened with such duplicative requirements compared to
their U.S. counterparts. . . .Bearing this in mind, the SEC should
recognize the equivalence of EU corporate governance systems
and thus fully exempt not only EU lawyers but also EU companies
and auditors from the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, also with
regard to audit committee requirements.
39
See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a–z-3 (2002); Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a–ff (2002).
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See, e.g., SEC, Proposed Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies’
Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877, 41,882 (June 20, 2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-46079.htm.
44
See id. See also Falencki, supra note 12, at 1216 (noting that “despite the
longstanding adherence to the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
regulatory frameworks, the SEC felt unable to ignore the language of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 which calls for application to all companies that list stock on the
U.S. capital markets”).
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In response to the criticism of foreign government entities and
corporations, the SEC has created various narrow exemptions for
foreign entities. The SEC also extended compliance deadlines for
foreign issuers. However, the SEC continues to apply the Act’s
provisions to European corporations issuing securities on the U.S.
market or filing reports with the SEC.
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PLAN
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission (EC) published an
action plan entitled, “Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing
Corporate Governance in the EU” (the Plan).45 The Plan implements
new measures that strengthen shareholders’ rights, protect third
parties, and foster business efficiency and competitiveness.46 By
implementing these reforms, the EC respects the diversity of each
member state’s response to the problems addressed by the Act.47
Although the EC adopted the Plan only nine months after the adoption
of the Act, the Commission emphasized that:
[The Plan] should help shape international regulatory
developments. The EU must define its own European
corporate governance approach, tailored to its own
cultural and business traditions. Indeed, this is an
opportunity for the Union to strengthen its influence
in the world with good, sensible corporate governance
rules. Corporate governance is indeed an area where
standards are increasingly being set at international
level, as evidenced by the recent developments
observed in the United States. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, adopted on 30 July 2002 in the wave of a series
of scandals, delivered a rapid response. The Act
unfortunately creates a series of problems due to its
outreach efforts on European companies and auditors,
and the Commission is engaged in an intense
regulatory dialogue with a view to negotiating
acceptable solutions with the U.S. authorities (in
particular the Securities and Exchange Commission).

45
46
47

Latham & Watkins LLP, supra note 25.
Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at 5.
Id.
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In many areas, the EU shares the same broad
objectives and principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and in some areas, robust, equivalent regulatory
approaches already exist in the EU. In other areas,
new initiatives are necessary. Earning the right to be
recognized as at least “equivalent” alongside other
national and international rules is a legitimate end in
itself.48
The Plan set forth short, medium, and long-term objectives49
designed to affect reform in the areas of corporate governance,
shareholders’ rights, and transparency.50 The EC intended to
accomplish its short-term objectives between 2003–2006, its mediumterm objectives between 2006–2009, and its long-term objectives after
2009.51 As of June 2005, the Commission had purportedly addressed
all actions originally identified as short-term objectives in the Plan.52
The EC’s approach integrated several other prior initiatives as part
of the Plan’s overall objective. The EC previously set forth “The
Financial Reporting Strategy of 2002,” which aimed to improve
financial reporting by adopting a common set of accounting
standards.”53 Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services, has stressed that the Plan “must be
focused and based on a solid assessment of actual needs of market
players and investors [and the Plan’s] potential impact . . . must also
be subject to careful and thorough assessment.”54 To this end, the EC
“will seek to support corporate development and foster growth in an
48

Id.
See id. at Appendix A.
50
See id. at 2. The Plan looks specifically at the areas of capital maintenance and
alteration, groups and pyramids, corporate restructuring and mobility, the European
private company, and enhancing the transparency of for national legal forms of
enterprise.
51
See id. at Appendix A.
52
Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. and Servs., The
European Corporate Governance Action Plan: Setting Priorities, Second European
Corporate Governance Conference, Luxembourg (June 28, 2005), transcript available
at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mccreevy/allspeeches_en.htm.
53
See Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at 3–4. See also “The
Communication on the priorities for the statutory audit in the EU.” These initiatives
are not explicitly part of the Plan, but they seek to solve the same problems as the U.S.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act through an integrated approach. See id.
54
McCreevy, supra note 52.
49
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environment of trust and confidence in corporations and markets
[because] businesses and investors alike need appropriate and efficient
regulation, not over-regulation, but better regulation.”55
In several aspects of its Plan, particularly in its non-legislative
proposals, the EC follows its Member States’ traditional “comply or
explain” approach.56 Under this approach, companies may choose to
disclose whether they comply with the applicable code,57 and then they
must explain any material departures from it.58 The Plan also uses both
legislative instruments and broad recommendations, focusing on
flexibility by accommodating the different approaches of its member
countries. In addition, the EC approach phases in requirements over
several years. In contrast, the SEC approach implements the Act’s
rigid set of rules and reforms rapidly and with universal application,
only considering the difference in issuers’ home countries in a posthoc fashion.59
IV. THE MAJOR REFORMS
This section examines the Act’s major reforms and the SEC’s
rules, with an emphasis on their impacts on European companies. In
addition, this section analyzes the pertinent provisions of the EC’s
Plan and any exemptions the SEC has already implemented. Finally,
each section discusses further steps the SEC should take towards
exempting European issuers from complying with the Act. The major
reforms of both the Act and the Plan relate to A) accounting standards
and financial reporting disclosures, B) accounting oversight, C)
auditor independence, and D) corporate governance. Each reform, its
impact on European companies, its counterpart in the EC Plan, and
any relevant SEC exemptions for European issuers are discussed in
turn below.

55

Id.
See Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive
or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the
(supervisory) board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 4 [hereinafter 2005 O.J. (L 52)]. “This approach
enables companies to reflect sector- and enterprise-specific requirements, and the
markets to assess the explanations and justifications provided. Id.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See discussion, infra Part III(A)–(D).
56
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A. Accounting Standards and Financial Reporting Disclosures
Some of the most important reforms affecting investor confidence
in publicly traded companies are those relating to accounting standards
and financial reporting disclosures. Both the Act and the EC’s Plan
incorporate strict disclosure requirements.60 To ease tensions and help
facilitate a more global economy, the United States should bring its
accounting practices in line with European and international standards
by adopting IFRS or a similar principles-based accounting standard.
1. The Act
The Act imposes various corporate disclosure requirements in the
areas of accounting and financial reporting. Section 401 of the Act
requires that an issuer disclose “all material correcting adjustments
that have been identified by a registered public accounting firm”61 in
accordance with GAAP and SEC rules. An issuer must also disclose:
[a]ll material off-balance sheet transactions,
arrangements, obligations (including contingent
obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with
unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may
have a material current or future effect on financial
condition, changes in financial condition, results of
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital
resources, or significant components of revenue or
expenses.62
The rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to Section 401 are equally
applicable to both domestic and foreign issuers.63 Foreign issuers,
whose primary financial statements are prepared in accordance with
non-GAAP standards, must reconcile the non-GAAP standards to the
U.S. GAAP, in addition to identifying any differences between the

60

Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(E).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 401. See generally Final Rule:
Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Release No. 33-8182 (Apr. 7,
2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8182].
62
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 401.
63
See Release No. 33-8182, supra note 63.
61
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foreign standard and U.S. GAAP “if it would be necessary for an
understanding of the financial statements as a whole.”64
Regulation G, adopted in accordance with Section 341, applies
when a company uses a non-GAAP standard.65 Regulation G requires
a “presentation of the most directly comparable financial measure
calculated and presented in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.”66 Any issuer, including foreign issuers,
disclosing non-GAAP financial measures must present such
information in a true and accurate manner that does not omit material
facts and must reconcile the non-GAAP financial standard with
GAAP.67 Thus, requiring foreign issuers to comply with Regulation G
imposes significant costs on issuers preparing financial statements
using non-GAAP standards.
2. The EC’s Plan
In June 2000, the EC adopted the EC Financial Reporting
Strategy, requiring all listed E.U. companies to prepare their
consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS, starting January 1,
2005.68 In light of the securities market globalization, the EC
recognized the desire to develop a “single, efficient, and competitive
EU securities market.”69 The EC’s objective in adopting IFRS is to
“accelerate the completion of a single securities market” and “to
enhance comparability of financial statements.”70 After carefully

64

Id. (noting that “We believe that the references to U.S. GAAP in the definition
best achieve the appropriate scope of arrangements that require more transparent
disclosure, regardless of any particular accounting treatment”).
65
See Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures,
Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65; FILE NO. S7-43-02 (Mar. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Release No. 33-8176].
66
SEC, 17 C.F.R. 244.100(a)(1) (2003). See also Release No. 33-8176, supra
note 67.
67
See 17 C.F.R. 244.100(b). See also Release No. 33-8176, supra note 67;
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(E)(3).
68
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament, EU Financial Reporting Strategy: the Way Forward
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 359 final) 2 (2000) [hereinafter EU Financial Reporting
Strategy].
69
Id. at 2–3 (noting that “Member States’ securities markets are in a period of
dramatic change and increasing consolidation, driven by new technologies,
globalization and the effect of the Euro”).
70
Id. at 2.
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considering the benefits of and differences between the IFRS and U.S.
GAAP, the EC elected to adopt IFRS.71 Regarding the differences
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, the EC noted:
Already [IFRS] provides a comprehensive and
conceptually robust set of standards for financial
reporting that should serve the needs of the
international business community. [IFRS] also has the
distinct advantage of being drawn up with an
international perspective, rather than being tailored to
the U.S. environment. U.S. GAAP, on the other hand,
is voluminous and is based on very detailed rules and
interpretations. Considerable education and training is
necessary in order to use its standards. In the U.S. its
effective application stems largely from the strong
regulatory and enforcement powers exercised by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The
European Union does not, of course, have influence
on the elaboration of U.S. GAAP.72
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
enforces IFRS.73 Although the IFRS transition costs European
companies significant outlay, Charlie McCreevy, the European
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, views this transition
as a success, because “given the success of the Euro and the growing
liquidity of E.U. capital markets, access to U.S. capital is no longer as
essential for many SEC-registrants as it once was. Rather the question
has become how to get out of the U.S. capital market!”74
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers
A foreign issuer is only exempt from complying with Regulation
G reconciliation requirements if:
(1) the securities of the registrant are listed or quoted
on a securities exchange or inter-dealer quotation

71
72
73
74
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system outside the United States; (2) the non-GAAP
financial measure is not derived from or based on a
measure calculated and presented in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles in the United
States; and (3) the disclosure is made by or on behalf
of the registrant outside the United States, or is
included in a written communication that is released
by or on behalf of the registrant outside the United
States.75
Foreign issuers remain exempt under Regulation G even if the
non-GAAP communications intended for a foreign market happen to
reach the United States.76 The SEC implemented Regulation G
because it “did not want to interfere with the regular practices
governing how foreign companies communicated with investors in
non-U.S. markets.”77
In response to the European Union’s costly conversion to IFRS,
the SEC recently adopted a rule permitting European issuers using
IFRS for the first time78 to reconcile their financial statements to U.S.
GAAP standards over two years, as opposed to three years, as required
by Regulation G.79 This minor change to the U.S. GAAP
reconciliation requirement still subjects European firms to costs
beyond those necessary to achieve the Act’s goals. The EC, however,
expects to reach an agreement with the SEC, which would commit the
SEC to remove the U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirement as early as
2007, but no later than 2009.80
Furthermore, under the Act, the SEC undertook a project entitled
“Study and Report on Adopting Principles-Based Accounting” to
determine whether the United States should transition from GAAP to
an international accounting standard, such as IFRS.81 IFRS is a
75

17 C.F.R. 244.100(c).
See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Speech by SEC Chairman: U.S. Capital
Markets in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World: Why Our Markets Should Matter to
Foreign Issuers (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012505whd.htm.
77
Id.
78
Before January 1, 2007. See Final Rule: First-Time Application of
International Financial Reporting Standards, Release Nos. 33-8567, 34-51535 (May
20, 2005) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8567].
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 108(d)(1).
76
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principles-based accounting method, whereas GAAP is rules-based.82
The study, which the SEC completed in 2003, concluded that the
United States should adopt an accounting standard similar to
international accounting standards, such as IFRS, because “the
adoption of objectives-oriented principles-based accounting standards
in the United States would be consistent with the vision of reform that
was the basis for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”83
Nevertheless, the United States has not followed the E.U.’s
example of using IFRS, which has created a roadblock for European
issuers registering with the SEC.84 European issuers are already
undergoing the difficult transition of adopting IFRS in place of their
home-country accounting standards. The difficulty of this transition is
only exacerbated by the fact that these same European issuers must
also reconcile IFRS with U.S. GAAP; instead of imposing this
reconciliation requirement on European issuers, the SEC should permit
them to file financial statements with the SEC using only IFRS. Doing
so would greatly reduce costs imposed upon the European issuers,
while still accomplishing the investor protection objectives of the
Act.85 Additionally, the SEC should consider adopting IFRS, or a
similar principle-based accounting standard, in order to bring U.S.
accounting practices in line with European and international standards.
Such a transition may ultimately prove possible if, as discussed
previously, the SEC removes the U.S. GAAP reconciliation
requirement by 2009.86

82

See Anupama J. Naidu, Comment, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The
Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate Into Costs to the
United States, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 271, 287–88 (2004).
83
SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on
the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based
Accounting System (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
principlesbasedstand.htm.
84
For more information regarding the work of the FASB and IASB on the
convergence of a global accounting standard see http://www.fasb.org/intl/
convergence_iasb.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
85
DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, 3 ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS,
2005 SUPPLEMENT 22 (2005). In determining how a particular transaction should be
treated, the IFRS relies on broad principles, as opposed to U.S. GAAP’s specific rules
and on professional judgment.
86
See Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and
Services, EC Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and
Consistency (Dec. 1, 2005), transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
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B. Accounting Oversight

In addition to the changes to accounting standards and financial
reporting disclosures, the Act has also made significant changes to
accounting oversight. The accounting industry has become a global
business,87 and as a result, accounting firms have consolidated and
expanded their worldwide audit services.88 Prior to the Act, the
accounting profession more or less regulated itself, setting its own
accounting standards and conducting private disciplinary measures.89
In the United States, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
made rules, set accounting standards, and conducted independent
tribunals when complaints arose.90 The FASB’s decisions were
incorporated into federal law and followed by the SEC.91
As described below, the Act changed auditing practices
significantly by tightening controls, federalizing the accounting
industry, and creating a new oversight board. The EC’s system
parallels the situation in the United States prior to the new
modifications, but it too will change as the EC implements the Plan. If
the EC strengthens the oversight capabilities of the CESR and the
Committee on Auditing so that they are more in line with the United
States new oversight board’s functions, then the SEC should consider
exempting European issuers from registration and inspection by the
U.S. oversight board.
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/750&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
87
SEC, Revision of Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed.
Reg. 76,008, 76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/337919.htm.
88
See id. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 9, at 484–85.
89
See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 13–14.
90
Tracy N. Tucker, International Accounting Standards in the Wake of Enron
Essay: It Really is Just Trying to Help: The History of FASB and its Role in Modern
Accounting Practices, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1023 (2003). “The FASB was
launched amid general optimism and enthusiasm. It was literally unique in almost
every respect, most notably in the fact that it was a rule-making body financed and
operated entirely in the private sector but whose decisions would be backed by federal
law and a powerful federal regulatory agency. The authority of the FASB derives from
Congress in the Securities Acts of the early 1930s and comes through the SEC and the
trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation.” Id. at 1026–27 (internal quotations
omitted). See generally Facts About FASB, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2006).
91
See id. The FASB still exists, and its accounting standards have been adopted
by the PCAOB.
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1. The Act
One of the Act’s major reforms was the federalization of the
accounting industry and regulation by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board).92 The PCAOB
oversees auditors of public companies,93 establishes ethics and quality
control standards for auditors,94 and inspects public accounting firms.95
Although the PCAOB is responsible to regulate the accounting
industry, it may adopt rules and standards established by professional
private accounting organizations.96 The PCAOB also investigates and
charges public consulting firms for violations of rules relating to
audits, imposing sanctions for such violations.97 The SEC appoints
PCAOB members, approves PCAOB rules and professional standards,
approves the annual budget and support fees, acts as an appellate
authority for PCAOB disputes relating to PCAOB inspection reports,
and oversees PCAOB operations.98
All audit firms, including foreign audit firms “providing
significant audit services for issuers listed in the U.S.,”99 must register
with, and be inspected by, the PCAOB.100 In fact, any foreign auditing
firm that prepares or furnishes an audit report concerning an issuer is
subject to the Act and SEC rules “in the same manner and to the same
extent” as a domestic accounting firm.101 This requirement treats
foreign accounting firms the same as domestic accounting firms, thus
eliminating any incentive for either domestic or foreign companies to
use foreign accounting firms to circumvent the Act.102 Exempting

92

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at §§ 101–09.
Id. § 101(a).
94
Id. § 103.
95
Id. § 104.
96
Id. § 103(a)(3).
97
Id. §101(c).
98
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(A)(1).
99
Donaldson, supra note 76.
100
See id.
101
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(a)(1). However, registration
with the board itself will not subject a foreign accounting firm to state or federal court
jurisdiction other than with regard to controversies between those firms and the
PCAOB. See id.
102
See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 26.
93
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foreign accounting firms from complying with the Act would create “a
significant loophole in the protection offered U.S. investors.”103
2. The Plan
Established in 2001 by the EC, the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) is charged with overseeing the European
accounting industry and enforcing the IFRS.104 The CESR’s official
role is to improve coordination among European Securities Regulators
and to advise the EC, especially when it prepares draft measures for
the securities field.105 CESR, however, does not function as a
regulatory agency like the PCAOB.
The EC also established an additional oversight committee, the
E.U. Committee on Auditing, in May 1998.106 The committee meets
two or three times a year and is composed of statutory audit regulators
from the fifteen Member States, members from the three countries of
the European Economic Area, representatives of the audit profession,
as well as the internal auditors and European representatives of the
large audit firms.107 This committee’s overall objective is to develop a
universal view on statutory audits at the E.U. level, especially for
matters not covered by existing E.U. legislation.108
The agenda priorities for the Committee on Auditing are to
“review . . . the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as a
benchmark for E.U. audit requirements, examine the external quality
assurance systems for statutory audit, develop minimum requirements
to be applied throughout the single market, and examine a set of core
principles on independence and audit objectivity developed by the

103

S. Rep. 107–205 (July 3, 2002), p. 11.
European Commission, The International Accounting Standards,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/ias_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
105
See Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 1.
106
See Commission Communication, The Statutory audit in the European Union:
the way forward, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 286 final) (2003).
107
European Commission, Committees and Groups on Auditing,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/committee/index_ en.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2006).
108
See id. (noting that in the context of a single E.U. capital market audited
financial information should have the same level of credibility throughout the E.U.,
thus facilitating and stimulating cross border investments).
104
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Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE).”109 Through the
Committee on Auditing, the EC plans to maintain a system of
“monitored self-regulation” and to propose legislation only when
necessary.110 The EC’s system closely parallels that of the United
States prior to the creation of the PCAOB: the industry regulatory
body functions independently from the government in developing
minimum requirements and coordinating EC accounting and auditing
practices, with only occasional governmental legislative intervention.
3. The SEC exemptions for European issuers
PCAOB may determine whether it will subject or exempt certain
accounting firms from compliance with the Act. PCAOB may require
the compliance of foreign firms if the Board determines that the firms
play such significant roles in the preparation of audit reports that they
should be treated the same as United States firms preparing audit
reports.111 Conversely, the SEC and PCAOB—subject to SEC
approval—may also exempt a foreign accounting firm from any
provision of the Act, the SEC rules, or the PCAOB’s rules if it is
necessary or appropriate in light of public interest.112
In response to conflicts with foreign privacy laws and blocking
statutes, the PCAOB has made changes in the information required
from foreign accounting firms during the registration process.113 A
foreign accounting firm may now withhold information from its
application for registration when submitting such information if it
would violate foreign law.114 When withholding information,
applicants must submit a legal opinion stating that submitting the
information would violate foreign laws.115 The justifications for
withholding information under foreign laws generally relate to data

109

Id.
Id.
111
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(a)(2).
112
See id. at § 106(c).
113
See id. See also Final Rule: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules Relating to Registration System, Release No. 3447990 (Jun. 5, 2003).
114
Id.
115
Id.
110
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protection, employee privacy, client confidentiality, bank secrecy, and
national security.116
Regardless of foreign privacy laws, however, if a foreign
accounting firm issues an opinion or otherwise performs material
services upon which a registered public accounting firm relies in
issuing all or part of an audit report, the Act deems that foreign
accounting firm to have consented to produce its audit work papers for
the PCAOB or the SEC in connection with an investigation, and to be
subject to United States judicial jurisdiction for enforcement of any
request to produce such papers.117 Domestic accounting firms that rely
on a foreign firm’s work receive the same treatment, and the SEC
considers the domestic accounting firm to have received the foreign
firm’s consent to such production as a condition of its reliance on the
foreign firm’s opinion.118
While the SEC could consider exempting European issuers from
registration and inspection by the PCAOB, exemptions should not be
necessary because it is unlikely the EC will strengthen the European
accounting oversight capabilities. Instead, the EC has stated that it will
maintain a system of self-regulation in the accounting industry. The
EC’s system of “monitored self-regulation” parallels the United
States’ situation prior to the creation of the PCAOB. Even without an
equivalent European oversight body in place, the SEC’s current rule
permitting foreign accounting firms to omit information conflicting
with non-U.S. laws respects foreign laws. The PCAOB’s reach
concerning registration requirements and information privacy is
therefore adequately limited.
C. Auditor Independence
Another of the Act’s important reforms increases enforcement of
auditor independence. Since reliable information regarding a business’
financial health is central to investors’ decisions, third-party auditors
are charged with independently examining a corporation’s financial
statements119 and ultimately expressing an opinion about the accuracy

116

Letter from Ernst & Young, LLP, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (July 2,
2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/pcaob 200303/ernstyoung070203.htm.
117
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(b).
118
See id. at § 106(b)(2).
119
See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 90, at 8–9.
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of the financial statements.120 Requiring the auditor’s independence
will “enhance the integrity of the audit process and the reliability of
audit reports on issuers’ financial statements.”121
1. The Act
Overall, the Act requires increased auditor independence by
focusing on auditors and audit committees, as well as the executives
and directors of public companies.122 The Act expands the list of nonaudit services that an auditor is prohibited from providing to an
issuer,123 requires an issuer’s audit committee to pre-approve all audit
and non-audit services provided to the issuer by the auditor,124 and
requires that partners on the audit team for a particular company rotate
every five years.125 To avoid conflicts of interest:
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting
firm to perform for an issuer any audit service
required by this title, if a chief executive officer,
controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting
officer, or any person serving in an equivalent position
for the issuer, was employed by that registered
independent public accounting firm and participated

120

See id.
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(A). The Act
“establishes a comprehensive framework to modernize and reform the oversight of
public company auditing, improve quality and transparency in financial reporting by
those companies, and strengthen the independence of auditors. It promotes
competition among service providers, enhances accurate investor decision-making
throughout the capital markets, and seeks to correct shortcomings that have threatened
the reputation of those markets for integrity.” HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8,
at 13.
122
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 201–09.
123
Id. at § 201. The following services are listed as falling outside the scope of
an auditor’s practice: “1) bookkeeping…; 2) financial information systems design and
implementation; 3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness options, or contribution-inkind reports; 4) actuarial services; 5) internal audit outsourcing services; 6)
management functions or human resources; 7) broker or dealer, investment advisor, or
investment banking services; 8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the
audit; and 9) any other service that the PCAOB determines, by regulation, is
impermissible.” Id.
124
Id. at § 202.
125
Id. at § 203.
121
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in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the 1year period preceding the date of the initiation of the
audit.126
Other provisions require the auditor to report certain matters to the
issuer’s audit committee and require disclosing to investors certain
information relating to audit and non-audit services the auditor
provides as well as information on fees paid to the auditor.127
Section 301 of the Act and the accompanying SEC rules set forth
the independence requirements for members of an issuer’s audit
committee.128 All audit committee members must be independent. The
audit committee must be directly responsible for the appointment,
compensation, retention, and oversight of a company’s outside
auditors; and outside auditors must report directly to the audit
committee.129 No member of an audit committee may accept a
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer other
than in their capacity as a member of the audit committee, board of
directors or other board committee.130 This requirement is known as
the “compensation prong.”131
Further, an audit committee member cannot be an “affiliate” of the
issuer or of a subsidiary of the issuer, other than in that affiliate’s
capacity as member of the audit committee or director.132 Specifically,
the Act defines an “affiliate” as “a person that directly or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is
under common control with, the person specified.”133 The SEC added
126

Id. at § 206.
Id. at §§ 201–09. See also Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note
2, at § III(A)(2).
128
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301; Standards Relating to Listed
Companies Audit Committees, Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC Docket 2876 (Apr. 9,
2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8220]. The rules direct the nation’s exchanges to
prohibit any company that is not in compliance with the Section 301 audit committee
requirements established by Section 301 from listing on such exchange. See
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III(F)(1). These rules
prevent auditors from controlling a company’s financial reporting system by first
designing the internal audit system, and then purporting to offer an unbiased external
audit. See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 15.
129
See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III(F)(1).
130
Release No. 33-8220.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301(3)(B)(i).
131
See Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128.
132
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301(3)(B)(ii).
133
Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006).
127
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a safe harbor to this provision, wherein “a person who is not an
executive officer or a shareholder owning ten percent or more of any
class of voting equity securities of a specified person will be deemed
not to control such specified person.”134 Where an audit committee
member is a significant shareholder, owning ten percent or more of the
entity’s shares, such member’s decisions regarding appointment,
retention, and oversight of the outside auditor may be tainted by
financial interests in the entity. For example, the member would have a
financial interest in portraying the corporation’s financial situation
positively and would therefore likely seek to appoint an auditor who
would provide a favorable opinion of the company’s financial
statements.
In American corporations, compliance with such requirements is
easy to ascertain, albeit costly, because American publicly traded
corporations are typically owned by millions of shareholders.135 Most
American publicly traded corporations have widely dispersed
ownership, and no one group of shareholders exercises ultimate
control over selecting directors.136 Thus, separation of ownership and
control characterizes American corporations.137
Applying the Act’s independence requirements to European
corporations, however, is more than just costly. Although the

134

Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128.
See Benjamin Mojuye, French Corporate Governance in the New
Millennium: Who Watches the Board in Corporate France?, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 73,
74 (2000) (discussing how U.S. public corporations typically divide shares among
millions of individuals, who can sell their stocks quickly if and when they become
dissatisfied with the corporation’s management).
136
See id. The directors manage the corporation and the control of the
corporation is separated from its ownership. Shareholders own the corporation—by
virtue of their stock ownership interest—and they elect a board of directors to exercise
control over the corporation. The directors then choose the officers to run the business,
subject to their supervision. See id.
137
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE
LAW 85 (1999) (describing how institutional investors also play a large role in
American investing strategy, accounting for approximately seventy percent of all
trading activity in the U.S.); see Ben McClure, Institutional Investors and
Fundamentals:
What’s
the
Link?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
Oct.
15,
2005,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/101503.asp.
Institutional
investors consist of mutual funds, pension funds, banks and other large financial
institutions. These institutional investors act as intermediaries for individuals investing
their money in securities. These types of investment entities are often considered
“smart money” because, as professional traders and stock market watchers, they have
more knowledge and expertise than average investors. See id.
135
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fundamental common law and civil law concepts of the corporation
rest on the same medieval roots,138 European corporation ownership
structures are fundamentally different from their U.S. counterparts.139
In Europe, a corporation’s shareholders often have a significant stake
in the company’s equity.140 For example, in France the dominant
shareholder is usually a family, company, or the State.141 In Germany,
a “universal bank” typically owns a large share of the corporation,142
which makes it unlikely that board members and audit committee
members in these corporations will meet the safe harbor’s ten percent
maximum ownership requirement. Moreover, through shared
ownership, European governments have historically exercised “special
rights” to retain control of privatized corporations.143 Such special
rights permit the government to veto or hinder changes in the
enterprise’s ownership structure or its management.144 Such
circumstances greatly limit an investor’s right to participate in the
corporation’s management.145 Examining German and French board of
director and audit committee practices reveals the difficulties posed by
the Act’s independence requirement.

138

See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, 3 LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 14–
16 (1983) (discussing how the concept of the corporate form in both civil law and
common law societies developed out of ancient medieval and Roman law and how
such concepts developed into canon law in the early thirteenth century, followed by
merchant law, which served as the model for the modern civil and common law
corporations); See also PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO
CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 3–4 (1993)
(noting that despite disagreement over the extent that Roman law accepted concepts of
corporations, modern corporate law has distinct direct or indirect roots in Roman law).
139
But, in both the U.S. and in European civil law countries, such as Germany
and France, the corporation itself is a separate legal entity separate from its
shareholders. See Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German
Corporate Law Norms, 16 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 431, 435 (2002); Naidu, supra
note 82, at 280.
140
Sophie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United
States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, in The Harvard John M. Olin
Discussion Paper Series, at 1 (Discussion Paper No. 490, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=623286.
141
Id.
142
See id.
143
European Comm’n, Special Rights in Privatized Companies in the Enlarged
Union–A Decade Full of Developments 4 (Comm’n Staff Working Document, July 22,
2005).
144
Id.
145
Id.
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a. German practice. While German and U.S. corporate practices
share common traits, some differences between them make it difficult
for German companies to comply with the Act’s independence
requirement. The German corporation most similar to an American
publicly traded corporation is the Aktiengesellschaft (AG).146 Unlike a
U.S. corporation, however, the AG has a two-tiered board structure
consisting of a managing board and a supervisory board.147 At least
one-third of a corporation’s supervisory board members must be
employee representatives.148
Commercial banks typically own the majority of stock held in
AG.149 This phenomenon results from the fact that historically,
Germans are very risk averse and will not invest in corporations the
same way Americans do.150 Consequently, German banks play an
important role as intermediaries. Individuals purchase the majority of
stocks in a German corporation through one of the large banks in a
similar fashion to any other product available to depositors.151 As a
result, in most corporations, the supervisory board generally consists
of representatives of large German banks acting as executive officers
of the company. 152 This creates “an interlocking network among
supervisory boards within Germany.”153 The EC delegates auditing
responsibilities to the managing board, and many German companies
must have employees or union representatives on their audit
committees.154 These practices make it difficult to comply with the
Act’s independence requirement. Individuals affiliated with the
company, such as employees or union representatives often sit on the
managing board, which violates the Act’s Section 301 independence
requirement. Furthermore, since German banks often own the majority
of shares in AG’s, any individual associated with such banks, who also
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sits on the audit committee, would violate the independence
requirement if the bank owns ten percent or more of the AG’s shares.
Because the inherent structure of many German corporations makes
compliance with the Act so difficult, the SEC should consider granting
exemptions for German corporations and other similarly structured
European companies.
b. French practice. Similar to German corporations, French
corporations face numerous challenges trying to comply with the Act
because of inherent corporate structure. French corporations use one of
two different management structures: a one-tiered board, consisting of
a board of directors; or a two-tiered board, comprised of an executive
board and a supervisory board and modeled after the German
corporate structure.155 Although the single-board-of-directors approach
is used most often, corporations may use a two-tiered board when one
group of shareholders agrees that it will not play an active role in the
corporation’s management, when the corporation is family owned, or
when the corporation’s management requires more independence from
the shareholders.156 In a traditional French corporation with a single
board of directors, the board controls the corporation and participates
in the corporation’s management.157 In the two-tiered system, there is a
clear delegation of powers. The executive board manages the
corporation and the supervisory board controls the actions of the
executive board without taking part in the corporation’s
management.158 Also, similar to Germany, France is characterized by a
“bank-centered capital market and a singularly concentrated ownership
structure.”159 In French public corporations, known as Societes
Anonymes (SA), stockholdings have traditionally been relatively
concentrated among specific families, financial institutions,
corporations, or the State.160 As a result, directors of different
corporations are often linked to one another, and members of one
corporation’s board of directors often sit on other corporations’
boards.161
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Problems with compliance also result in French corporations
because, except for state-owned corporations, families own or
dominate more than fifty percent of the largest public corporations in
France.162 These family-owned corporations combine ownership and
control, and the board does not play an independent role.163
Concentration of ownership by institutional investors such as banks,
insurance companies, and networking corporations comprise the
remaining group of large corporations.164 French banks, as dominant
shareholders in French corporations, have considerable power within
corporations through their membership on boards and through the
companies’ heavy reliance on debt financing.165 Since the State owns a
significant share in many public corporations, it traditionally utilizes
its shareholder vote to place government-related board members on the
board of directors.166 Consequently, members of the board of directors
may often be closely related to, or have substantial interest in, the
corporation. As a result, an individual affiliated with the corporation or
representing a substantial shareholder will likely sit on an audit
committee, thereby violating the Act’s Section 301 independence
requirements.
Consequently, French companies, as members of the Association
Francais des Enterprises Privées, Association des Grandes
Entreprises Francais (AFEP-AGREF) have complained about the
negative consequences of the compensation and affiliated-person
prongs of the independence requirement.167 These companies criticized
the Act as automatically disqualifying directors that may also be
executive officers of a bank that is a controlling shareholder, in the
event that the bank receives any fees in connection with transactions in
the ordinary course of business.168 As to the affiliated-person prong,
one company stated, “it is not clear to us why a director, otherwise
independent, should be disqualified from audit committee service if
162
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that director also sits on the board of entity [sic] in which the issuer
holds a substantial interest but less than a majority.”169
As a result of this majority shareholder influence on the boards of
directors of European corporations, it is difficult for these corporations
to comply with the Act’s strict independence requirements. Without an
exemption, such European corporations may have to undergo
burdensome costs and forgo traditional European practices in
restructuring their boards of directors and audit committees.
2. The EC’s Plan
In light of recent European accounting scandals, the Plan includes
a specific proposal to adopt a short-term recommendation
(Recommendation), placing special emphasis on audit committee
standards.170 The EC expressed its intention to address the role of audit
committees in supervising audits, both in selecting an external auditor
for appointment by shareholders and monitoring the relationship with
the external auditor.171 The EC also stated it would address such
internal aspects as reviewing accounting policies as well as monitoring
internal audit procedures and the company’s risk management
system.172
Acknowledging unique European practices, the EC’s Plan
provides a flexible approach whereby corporations with varying
structures may face fewer obstacles to achieve compliance. On
February 15, 2005, addressing the role of audit committees and related
board and audit committee independence standards,173 the EC
recommended that Member States delegate responsibilities to the audit
committee. Examples of these responsibilities include ensuring the
accuracy of financial reports and other disseminated information, as
well as monitoring procedures established for evaluation and
management of risks.174 As a result, the EC established independence
requirements because most audit committees are composed of
members of the board of directors or supervisory board.175 In contrast
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with the U.S. requirements, the EC’s approach integrates its traditional
“comply or explain” principle, whereby companies are “invited to
disclose whether they comply with the code and to explain any
material departures from it.”176 The EC adopted this approach so that
companies would be able to comply with sector- and enterprisespecific requirements that may depart from the EC or national
independence standards.177
As to independent directors, the recommendation states that “the
(supervisory) board should comprise a sufficient number of committed
non-executive or supervisory directors, who play no role in the
management of the company or its group and who are independent in
that they are free of any material conflict of interest.”178 However, “in
view of the different legal systems existing in Member States,” the EC
declined to determine what proportion of board members should
consist of independent directors.179 Nevertheless, the EC should
organize boards in such a way “that a sufficient number of
independent non-executive or supervisory directors play an effective
role in key areas where the potential for conflict of interest is
particularly high.”180 To this end, the EC should create audit
committees within the supervisory board or the board of directors.181
Audit committees should be composed exclusively of non-executive or
supervisory directors, and at least a majority of members should be
independent.182 In contrast to the Act’s strict independence rules, the
Plan defines independence as being “free of any material conflict of
interest.”183 Furthermore, under the Plan, audit committees should
assist the board in (1) monitoring the integrity of financial information
provided by the company, particularly by reviewing the relevance and
consistency of the accounting methods and the internal control and
risk systems the company uses; (2) ensuring that major risks are
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properly identified, managed, and disclosed; and (3) ensuring the
effectiveness of the internal-audit system.184
In 2002, the EC adopted a recommendation requiring Member
States to prohibit statutory auditors from carrying out statutory audits,
either on their own, or on behalf of an audit firm, if they are not
independent.185 The recommendation defines independence as not
having any “financial, business, employment or other relationships
between the statutory auditor and his client (including certain nonaudit services provided to the audit client) that a reasonable and
informed third party would conclude compromise the statutory
auditor's independence.”186
Member States must ensure that statutory auditors are liable for
sanctions when they do not perform a statutory audit in an appropriate
manner.187 Member States must also ensure that members and
shareholders of an audit firm do not intervene in a statutory audit in a
manner that jeopardizes the independence of the individuals
performing the audit.188 Moreover, regarding non-audit services, the
recommendation limits the type of non-audit services a Statutory

184
Id. at Annex 1, art. 4.2. With respect to the external auditor appointed by the
company, the audit committee, at a minimum, should perform the following functions:
1) make recommendations to the supervisory board relating to the selection,
appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor and to the terms of his
appointment; 2) monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity,
particularly by reviewing the audit firm’s compliance with applicable guidance
relating to the rotation of audit partners, the fees paid by the company, and other
related regulatory requirements; 3) ensure the nature and extent of non-audit services
are under continuous review, based upon, inter alia, disclosure by the external auditor
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purpose of preventing any material conflicts of interest from arising; 4) set forth and
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responsiveness to recommendations made in the external auditor’s management letter;
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Auditor or Audit Firm may provide to an audit client.189 Much like the
Act, the recommendation also sets forth examples of prohibited nonaudit services.190
The foregoing EC recommendations, if adopted by Member
States, would help bring European auditor and audit committee
independence provisions more in line with the Act’s independence
requirements. However, the EC’s proposed independence requirement
is not as strict as the requirement set forth in the Act. For instance,
Member States have flexibility in applying these recommendations,
and their individual independence requirements will likely reflect
prevailing national corporate practices. The EC’s broad definition of
independence and its “comply or explain” approach directly contrast
with the Act’s stringent independence requirements. Therefore, the
EC’s independence requirements will not likely transform European
board structure enough to bring it entirely into compliance with the
Act. A European issuer, which may easily comply with European
independence requirements, will likely have to undergo significant
restructuring costs when issuing securities in the U.S. market.
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers
As a result of the differences in European corporate practices, the
SEC has made limited accommodations to foreign issuers pertaining to
auditor and audit committee independence.191 The final rules include
several provisions applicable only to foreign issuers in order to
“address potential conflicts with foreign legal requirements where
consistent with fulfilling the investor protection mandate of the

189
The company’s “overall safeguarding system” must ensure that those
employed by the Audit Firm or its “Network . . . neither take any decision nor take
part in any decision-making on behalf of the Audit Client or one of its affiliates, or its
management while providing a non-audit service; and where an independence risk
remains due to specific threats which may result from the nature of a non-audit
service, this risk is reduced to an acceptable level.” Commission Recommendation
2002 O.J. (L 191), 7.1.
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Examples of such non-audit services include preparing accounting records
and financial statements, designing and implementing financial information
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senior management. Id. at 7.
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See Ethiopis Tafara, Acting Dir., OIA, SEC, Speech, Addressing
International Concerns Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (June 10, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch061003et.htm.
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Act.”192 In Final Rule 33-8220, the SEC makes appropriate
exemptions to address potential conflicts that the independence
requirement of Section 301 poses with foreign issuers’ corporate
structures.193
Acknowledging that Germany’s requirement that employees sit on
a corporation’s supervisory board would not meet the Act’s
independence requirement,194 the SEC made a limited exemption from
the independence requirement for such foreign issuers.195 The final
rule permits non-executive employees196 to sit on the audit committee
of a foreign private issuer if the employee is elected or named to that
issuer’s board of directors in accordance with one of the following: the
issuer’s governing law or documents, an employee collective
bargaining agreement, or some other home country legal or listing
requirement.197 Furthermore, with respect to a two-tiered board
system, which is prevalent in both Germany and France, the SEC’s
final rule clarifies that the supervisory board acts as the “board of
directors” for purposes of implementing the Act.198 Either the
supervisory board can form a separate audit committee, or the
supervisory board can serve as the audit committee if the entire
supervisory board is “independent” (within the meaning of Section
301 and the final rule).199 As applied to German issuers, employees
may continue to sit on the supervisory board in accordance with
German law, provided they are not executive officers.200
Because of criticism from European companies, the SEC
recognized that many foreign issuers permit representatives of
controlling shareholders or groups of shareholders to sit on their audit
committees.201 In its final rule, the SEC decided that one member of an
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audit committee can be a representative of an affiliate of a foreign
private issuer, provided they fulfill the “no compensation prong,”202
and they are not one of the issuer’s executive officers.203 Further, the
representatives may only have observer status on the committee and
may not participate as a voting member or as the chair of the audit
committee.204 This exemption brings both French and German
companies with more than one controlling shareholder represented on
the board or audit committee into compliance with the Act.205
Because many foreign governments hold significant shares of
issuing companies, or special shares permitting the government to
exercise certain rights over the issuer,206 such issuers would fail to
satisfy the Act’s independence requirement. Therefore, the SEC also
provided a limited exemption for foreign issuers with government
representatives sitting on their audit committees.207 Under the final
rule, an audit committee member can be a representative of a foreign
government or foreign governmental entity, provided the member does
not violate the “no compensation prong”208 and is not one of the
issuer’s executive officers.209 Foreign governments that are also listed
issuers are exempted entirely from the audit committee requirement of
the Act.210
In light of the EC’s recommendations regarding audit committee
independence requirements, the SEC should consider granting
additional exemptions on a country-by-country basis. The SEC should
consider permitting European governments that have implemented the
EC’s recommendations to provide comprehensive information on their
own independence requirements in order to determine whether to
exempt issuers in such countries. Thereafter the SEC should issue
exemptions based on whether each individual nation’s requirements
are equivalent to the Act’s independence standards. For example, a
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nation’s standards would be equivalent if its laws (a) develop an
independence standard so as to prevent significant shareholders (ten
percent or more) or affiliated persons from sitting on a company’s
audit committee, (b) have a similar compensation requirement as the
United States, and (c) eliminate or restrict the application of a “comply
or explain” approach. Exempting corporations on a country-bycountry basis under an equivalence approach should adequately
balance the need to respect differing European corporate norms while
still protecting American investors and maintaining the integrity of
U.S. markets.
D. Corporate Governance
Another major set of reforms affecting foreign securities issuers
relates to corporate responsibility. Corporate governance involves
protecting shareholders from self-dealing by those in control of a
corporation.211 This is particularly important in both American and
European corporations because the ownership of a publicly traded
corporation is often separate from its control.212 In the Act, corporate
governance reforms relate particularly to individual director and
executive officer responsibility. The EC’s Plan, however, focuses on
implementing rules providing for the collective responsibility of the
board rather than making specific individuals responsible for a
corporation’s control.
1. The Act
Provisions of the Act reflect Congress’ belief that individual
managers should be held responsible for a company’s financial
representations.213 Under the Act’s separate criminal and civil
provisions, CFOs and CEOs are now required to personally certify the
issuer’s annual and quarterly reports.214 Therefore, both the Act and
accompanying rules require the CEO and CFO to individually certify
that they have reviewed the reports and that based on their knowledge,
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the reports do not contain any material misstatements or omissions.215
The CEO and CFO are also responsible for certifying that (1) they
established and maintained internal disclosure controls and procedures
to ensure that material information relating to the company is made
known to them, (2) they designed internal controls over financial
reporting to provide reasonable assurance that financial reporting and
the preparation of financial statements are reliable, (3) they disclosed
any material change in the company’s internal control over financial
reporting, and (4) they disclosed to the auditors or audit committee any
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting as well as any
fraud.216 In addition, if the SEC requires an issuer to prepare an
accounting restatement due to a material non-compliance caused by
misconduct, the CEO and CFO must reimburse the issuer for “(1) any
bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following
the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first
occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting
requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of
the issuer during that 12-month period.”217
Requiring CEO and CFO certification for annual and quarterly
reports runs directly contrary to European practice, in which the board
of directors or the supervisory board must collectively certify the
accuracy of the company’s financial statements.218 Furthermore, the
E.U. does not currently have an internal-control reporting requirement.
Several European companies have complained about both the CEOand-CFO-certification provision and the internal-control reporting
requirements.219 For example, Porsche, the German car company,
cancelled plans to issue securities on the New York Stock
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Exchange,220 stating that it did not agree with the Act’s CEO-andCFO-certification requirements.221 By increasing management
responsibility, the Act may have deterred European companies from
participating in the U.S. market.
2. The EC’s Plan
In formulating its Plan relating to corporate governance reforms,
the EC considered each Member State’s unique practices and beliefs
regarding the roles of corporations and how corporations should be
financed.222 Consequently, the EC decided that adopting a full
European corporate governance code would not “achieve full
information” for investors about corporate governance rules affecting
companies in various European countries, nor would a code improve
corporate governance rules in Europe because harmonization would be
difficult to achieve.223 As part of the EC’s ongoing process to review
and implement corporate governance reforms, the EC created the
European Corporate Governance Forum (the Forum) in October
2004.224 The Forum consists of fifteen senior experts from various
professional backgrounds whose experience and high level of
expertise is widely recognized across Europe.225 The Forum should
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meet two or three times a year and deliver an annual report to the
EC.226
A major corporate governance reform elaborated upon in the Plan
relates to the composition, remuneration and responsibilities of the
board of directors.227 The EC’s proposal calls for giving E.U.-listed
companies the option of having either a one-tiered board structure,
with executive and non-executive directors, or a two-tiered board
structure, with managing directors and supervisory directors.228 The
Commission may also permit additional organizational freedom, but
first wishes to study the implications of doing so.229 The Plan suggests
that in certain areas where executive directors have clear conflicts of
interest, such as in audits, these decisions should be made exclusively
by non-executive or supervisory directors.230
On February 15, 2005, the EC adopted a set of recommendations
in which it confirmed the collective responsibility of either the board
of directors or the supervisory board for a company’s financial
statements.231 This recommendation does not take the form of a
legislative act. However, the EC requests that Member States take the
“necessary measures to promote the application . . . of the principles
set out in [its] Recommendation” by June 30, 2006, so that the EC may
closely monitor the situation in Member States and take further action
if necessary.232
The Forum “advised unanimously against the imposition of an
obligation for boards to certify the effectiveness of internal controls at
the present time.”233 The Forum instead decided that it would study the
U.S. experience in relation to such certification requirements.234 If it
adopts an internal-control certification requirement, “it would be
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necessary to strike the balance between the benefits of additional
requirements and the potential costs and burdens for companies.”235 In
the medium term, the EC also intends to examine how it might
enhance directors’ responsibilities.236
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers
The SEC granted foreign issuers a short-term exemption from
complying with requirements relating to disclosures of internal control
over financial reporting. Foreign issuers have until July 15, 2007, to
become a compliant. The SEC explains that foreign issuers have
“faced particular challenges in complying with the internal control
over financial reporting and related requirements, which include
language, culture, and organization structures that are far different
from what is typical in the United States.”237
CEO-and-CFO-certification requirements run directly contrary to
European practice, wherein the entire board certifies financial
statements. Imposing full board responsibility for financial statements
may provide similar corporate governance protection as a CEO-andCFO-certification requirement. This similar level of protection is only
possible if the EC or Member States impose collective liability on
board members. The Plan is uncertain on whether the EC intends to
impose collective liability on board members for non-compliance.
Therefore, the SEC should consider granting exemptions only to
issuers located in EC Member States wherein the laws provide for full
235
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board responsibility and liability. Doing so would achieve Congress’
objective of holding the management of a company fully responsible
for the corporation’s representations. In such cases, collective
responsibility may thus render individual CEO-and-CFO-certification
unnecessary.
However, CEO-and-CFO-certification regarding the effectiveness
of internal controls is still required under section 302 of the Act. If
legislation in individual European countries or by the EC achieves
board accountability for internal control efficiency, the SEC should
consider granting exemptions on a case-by-case basis. On the other
hand, this accountability is unlikely to occur in the near future, as the
EC plans to study the effects of U.S. internal control certification
requirements prior to implementing similar legislation. Therefore, until
the EC imposes similar internal control certification, the SEC should
not consider granting internal control exemptions to European issuers.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE SHOULD THE SEC GO FROM HERE?
While the SEC has made progress in creating limited exemptions
for foreign corporations, in light of the EC Plan, and the existence of
fundamental differences between European and American
corporations, the SEC should consider granting further limited
exemptions for European companies. The agency should (1) permit
European issuers to file financial statements with the SEC using only
IFRS, (2) exempt European issuers from audit committee
independence requirements if the issuer’s home country independence
standards are equivalent to those set forth by the SEC, and (3) exempt
European issuers from CEO-and-CFO-certification requirements if the
issuer’s home country or if the EC imposes collective liability on
board members. Finally, the SEC should consider exempting European
issuers from PCAOB registration and inspection only if the EC’s
CESR and Committee on Auditing oversight capabilities are
sufficiently strengthened so as to parallel those of the PCAOB.
If the EC’s Plan is successfully developed and adopted, the
principles of the Act may eventually be realized throughout Europe. In
the long term, the SEC may be able to exempt European companies
from full compliance as to many of the Act’s provisions and
accompanying rules. However, the EC’s “comply or explain” position
directly contradicts the stringent rules imposed by the Act. Therefore,
in order for the SEC to fully exempt European issuers, the EC would
have to abolish its “comply or explain” rule.
As the EC’s Plan calls for three phases of implementation through
2009, it is yet to be determined whether the Plan will thoroughly
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achieve the goals of the Act, or even whether individual European
Member States will adopt the EC’s recommendations. It thus remains
to be determined how far the SEC should go in the long term to
exempt European companies from the stringent requirements of the
Act. In the meantime, granting the foregoing narrow exemptions
would appropriately take account of the EC’s developing Plan and
respect the different European corporate practices, while still
protecting American investors and preserving the integrity of the
American securities market.
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